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Low-income countries often offer tax incentives to induce foreign investment, but the effectiveness of these
measures may he limited by the domestic tax practices of investors' high-income home countries. Most high-income
countries provide a tax credit for the amount of tax paid to a foreign jurisdiction on the international profits of resident companies or individuals. Where no tax, or reduced tax, is paid to the foreign jurisdiction because of a tax incentive, the result is that the investor pays the same amount of tax they would have paid in the absence of the tax
incentive, but simply pays a larger proportion of it to the resident (high-income) state. In other words, the tax incentive offered by the low-income country has operated as a revenue transfer from the treasury of the low-income state
to the treasury of the high-income state. A tax sparing provision, included in a tax treaty negotiated between the two
countries, preserves the tax incentive by reducing the tax owed to the high-income country by the amount of tax that
would have been paid to the low-income country, but for the tax incentive. In theory, by incorporating tax sparing
provisions into tax treaties with low-income countries, high-income countries assist those countries in their efforts
to attract investment by protecting their ability to offer effective tax incentives. However, there has been much debate over whether these provisions are effective in practice.
*506 The author outlines the history of tax sparing provisions in Canada, Australia, the U.K. and the U.S., and
illustrates the early reluctance of these countries to follow the recommendations of international bodies regarding
tax sparing. The OECD has opposed these incentives and has concluded they have long-term shortcomings: they are
vulnerable to abuse, may erode tax bases and may fail to achieve their purported goal -- attracting investment to
low-income countries. The author argues that despite some recent empirical evidence to the contrary, tax sparing
provisions are ineffective in preserving tax incentives designed to attract foreign investment. She concludes that tax
sparing provisions used to support tax incentives are an ill-designed mechanism through which to improve social
and economic conditions in low-income countries. Cognizant that some low-income countries will continue to seek
tax sparing provisions in their tax treaties, the author recommends design features of those provisions that should
maximize their contribution to the development of the low-income countries while minimizing the potential for their
abuse.
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Introduction: The Role of Tax Sparing
One of the most pressing needs to ensure more equitable development around the world is increased investment
in low-income (capital-importing) countries. To attract private foreign direct investment (FDI), those countries frequently, indeed almost universally, offer tax incentives. Some high-income (capital-exporting) countries, including
Canada, have attempted to facilitate the effectiveness of these incentives by agreeing to “tax sparing” provisions in
their tax treaties with low-income countries.
*508 This paper argues that capital-importing countries should not seek to negotiate tax sparing provisions in
their tax treaties, and that if they do ask for them, capital-exporting countries should not agree to them. This might
seem like a surprising claim, given the admitted importance of private investment in achieving the urgent objective
of raising the standard of living in low-income countries. Nevertheless, I argue that negotiating tax sparing provisions is an illustration of good intentions leading to bad results.
The remainder of this introduction explains the operation and significance of the concept of tax sparing. To
place the discussion in its historical and contemporary context, Part I outlines the history of tax sparing provisions,
and compares their use by tax treaty negotiators in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia.
Although many high-income countries used such provisions in their tax treaties with low-income countries between
the 1970s and 1990s, in recent years these provisions have fallen somewhat into disfavour. Canada was the last of
the four counties under review to agree to a tax sparing provision, and granted its most recent one in 2002. Part I
concludes by reviewing the current position of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on tax sparing. Part II reviews the evidence on the effectiveness of tax sparing
provisions in light of their intended purpose. Part III deals directly with the arguments for and against the use of tax
sparing provisions and suggests that the adverse consequences of tax sparing provisions outweigh their benefits. Part
IV goes on to examine the design features of tax sparing provisions and recommends that if they are included in tax
treaties they should be tightly drawn.
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For those uninitiated in the Byzantine world of tax treaties, what follows is a quick overview of how tax sparing
provisions work, how in theory they might benefit capital-importing countries, and why, even if they operated as
they should, they are likely not as important as they are often claimed to be. I will use Canada's tax treaty with Mongolia as an example. Although every low-income, capital-importing country faces unique problems, Mongolia's
challenges are typical. In 2006, roughly 32 per cent of the Mongolian population lived below the *509 poverty line.
[FN1] It is the least densely populated country in the world and has very little arable land and no significant access
to water. The domestic food supply is limited, and meat products in particular are scarce. Much of the population
remains nomadic or semi-nomadic. While Mongolia is rich in mineral resources, including copper, coal, molybdenum, tin, tungsten and gold, it has a desperate need for foreign capital, technology, know-how and markets to develop these resources.
In 1990, the Mongolian democratic revolution ended a 70-year period of Russian-dominated socialism. Since
then, the Mongolian government has enacted a series of new economic policies, including tax and trade policies, in
an effort to improve the economic and social environment. To provide foreign investors with some certainty as to
the tax consequences of investing in Mongolia, and to remove any risk of being taxed in both Mongolia and in their
home countries, Mongolia has negotiated 24 bilateral tax treaties since its first, with China, signed in 1991.
Mongolian treaty negotiators have commonly insisted on tax sparing provisions in their tax treaties; all but six
of the country's 25 treaties include such provisions. [FN2] In eight, the tax sparing provision is mutual -- in other
words, Mongolia has granted a tax sparing provision to its trading partner and has received one in return. [FN3]
Mongolia's four most recent treaties, all signed after 1999, including one with Canada in 2002, [FN4] include tax
sparing provisions.
As an illustration of how a tax sparing provision works, assume a Canadian corporation sets up a gold mining
operation in Mongolia and earns $100 of mining profits. Normally, if the Canadian corporation had *510 sufficient
presence in Mongolia, it would be subject to a tax on its mining profits at the Mongolian corporate tax rate of 25 per
cent. However, since the corporation is resident in Canada, and therefore subject to tax in Canada on its world-wide
profits, it would also be taxed in Canada on the $100 of profits it earns in Mongolia. Assuming the Canadian corporate tax rate is 35 per cent, it would have to pay $35 to the Canadian government in addition to the $25 tax it paid to
the Mongolian government. It would thus be taxed twice on the same income. To avoid this result, Canada, like almost all countries, unilaterally grants its residents a tax credit for foreign taxes they pay on their foreign-source income. Therefore, the corporation's Canadian taxes of $35 would be reduced by the $25 paid to the Mongolian government, and it would in the end pay only $10 in Canadian tax. In effect, since Canada agrees to provide a tax credit
for the Mongolian tax, the corporation will only have to pay tax at the same rate as if it had invested in Canada. Of
course, Canada agrees to provide a tax credit for Mongolian tax only up to the maximum Canadian tax owing. If the
Mongolian tax rate were higher than the Canadian rate, Canada would not refund the excess Mongolian tax.
In an attempt to attract foreign investment in its mining industries, Mongolia provides various tax incentives.
From time to time it has even provided a complete tax holiday for new foreign investment in its natural resources
sector. If the Canadian corporation's mining operations are able to benefit from one of these tax holidays, the corporation will pay no tax in Mongolia on its profits earned there. However, it will still be liable to pay tax to the Canadian government on its world-wide income. Therefore, it will owe $35 to the Canadian government. Since it paid no
Mongolian tax, it will not be entitled to any amount as a foreign tax credit. Thus, even with the tax holiday in Mongolia, the corporation's overall tax position will not change. Instead of paying $25 tax to Mongolia and $10 to Canada, it will simply pay the full $35 to Canada. In effect, the incentive provision in Mongolia has simply served as a
$25 transfer from Mongolia's treasury to Canada's. Obviously, in this case, the Canadian tax laws completely offset
the effect of the Mongolian tax incentive. In such cases, the argument is that if tax incentives in capital-importing
countries are to have their intended effect, a tax sparing provision is needed.
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*511 In short, tax sparing provisions preserve the tax incentives granted by one jurisdiction (normally a lowincome jurisdiction) by requiring the other jurisdiction (normally a high-income jurisdiction) to give a tax credit for
the taxes that would have been paid to the low-income country if the incentive had not been granted. In this example, since Canada and Mongolia have agreed, subject to certain conditions, that Canada will grant its resident a $25
tax credit for Mongolian tax, (even though Mongolia itself does not actually collect that $25 because, to attract foreign investment, it has created a tax holiday for foreign firms operating mining businesses there), Canada will receive only the $10 of tax it would have received if Mongolia had not granted this tax incentive for foreign firms, and
the Canadian firm receives the full benefit of the Mongolian tax incentive.
Without getting into the staggeringly complicated details of how transborder income flows are taxed in most
countries, it is important to provide some background on those tax rules to highlight the significance of tax sparing
provisions. Generally, tax sparing provisions are not as significant as the above illustration suggests. In many cases,
the foreign corporation pays no tax to its home country on the income it earns in the other country, or only pays the
tax many years after earning the income, when the profits are repatriated to the home country.
In the illustration above, it was assumed that the Canadian corporation operated its mining business in Mongolia
through a branch. However, the corporation might instead incorporate a subsidiary corporation in Mongolia to operate the business. In this case, the subsidiary corporation is not taxed in Canada since it will not be resident in Canada. Furthermore, when the profits it earns in Mongolia are paid back to its Canadian parent in the form of dividends, the dividends also will not be taxed in Canada, because Canada exempts from tax the business income of
foreign affiliates of Canadian corporations earned in a country with which Canada has a treaty. In other words, tax
sparing provisions are important to Canadian corporations when they operate in a foreign country through a branch,
but not when they incorporate in the foreign country.
Tax sparing provisions are, in theory, more important in countries that do not exempt the business income of
foreign subsidiaries of their corporations and instead have what is often called a “gross-up and credit *512 system.”
The United States, for example, taxes the business income of subsidiaries of U.S. corporations and provides a tax
credit for foreign taxes paid when that income is repatriated to the U.S., usually in the form of a dividend paid to the
parent corporation. In such countries, tax sparing provisions are more significant because when the income is repatriated, if no foreign taxes have been paid because of a tax incentive, the full resident country tax will have to be
paid. However, even in those countries, a tax sparing provision might not be too significant. First, using the U.S. as
an example, the U.S. tax is deferred until the income is repatriated, which in some cases might be indefinitely. This
diminishes the importance of a tax sparing provision, often to the point of irrelevance, as the present value of the
future tax liability might be close to zero. [FN5] Second, instead of repatriating their foreign profits directly to the
U.S., multinationals are often able to route payments through a third country that does not tax the income. [FN6]
Finally, corporations that are repatriating profits from countries with tax incentives might be in what is referred to as
an excess foreign tax credit position, [FN7] meaning that the multinational has foreign tax credits from the country
in which it earned the income which exceed its U.S. tax liability on that income. In these circumstances, a tax sparing provision *513 is not required to preserve the effects of tax incentives in capital-importing countries.
Although tax sparing provisions may sound esoteric, and are little known outside the world of international tax
specialists, much has been written about them since they first appeared in tax treaties in the 1950s. Commentators
remain sharply divided on their merits. Some emphasize their importance to low-income countries, arguing passionately in their favour. [FN8] Others adamantly oppose them, citing their futility, their *514 potential for abuse and
other perverse effects. [FN9] Nevertheless, tax incentives continue to proliferate in low-income countries, [FN10]
and tax sparing provisions intended to preserve their effectiveness remain popular. [FN11]
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The central claim of this paper is that although tax sparing provisions may appeal to low-income countries that
perceive themselves to be in a competition for badly needed foreign investment, those countries should resist the
temptation to compete for investment by eroding their tax bases by introducing tax incentives preserved by tax sparing provisions. This topic remains vitally important because of the widely recognized need to rectify inequalities in
standards of living between low-income and high-income countries and to alleviate poverty in low-income countries. If tax incentive programs can provide low-income countries with needed foreign investment that results in increased standards of living, and if tax sparing provisions can help these *515 programs have that effect, surely highincome countries should be strongly encouraged to include such provisions in their tax treaties. However, if tax incentives protected by tax sparing provisions simply result in increased abuses of tax regimes in high-income countries, or in lost tax revenue for low-income countries without growth-enhancing and productivity-enhancing investment, surely such provisions should be abandoned.
As further justification for one more paper on tax sparing, the subject raises a number of the issues addressed in
the broader literature on the appropriate design of international tax regimes. In the last several years, a number of tax
scholars have turned to the question of how tax regimes might best be designed both to ensure the collection of taxes
in an increasingly globalized world and to promote the development of tax regimes in low-income countries. [FN12]
This paper examines one small but important question within that broader debate: should countries preserve the tax
incentives of other jurisdictions as a way of promoting development?
I. The Rise and Stall of Tax Sparing
A. The Genesis: U.K. Royal Commission on Taxation, 1953
Debates about the efficacy of tax sparing provisions have been ongoing since the provisions were first considered in the early 1950s. The first reported allusion to them can be found in the 1953 report of the British Royal
Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income. [FN13] That Commission was asked by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer to consider, on an urgent basis, whether special tax relief should be given where a United Kingdom resident had overseas profits and those profits *516 were subject to special relief in the overseas jurisdiction. Although
the question was narrowly posed to address the U.K. colonies, the Commission took on the broader question of
whether “the taxation net [was] drawn too widely or too narrowly in relation to ... the taxation of United Kingdom
residents (companies or individuals) on overseas profits.” [FN14]
In the following passage, the Commission identified for the first time the problem that has continued to plague
tax treaty administrators and scholars for the last 55 years -- whether a high-income country like the United Kingdom has an obligation to respect the tax incentive choices made by its lower-income colonial territories:
The ... particular difficulty is that the United Kingdom's present system of taxing overseas profits may involve
this country (and the concerns which it taxes) in a position of embarrassment towards other governments by frustrating the tax policies of those governments with regard to their own territories. For instance ... the government of another area may provide special tax concessions for “pioneer industries” or industries it desires to encourage, e.g., a
tax holiday for the opening years or very liberal allowance for amortisation or depreciation .... [T]he more it reduces
its tax claims the larger is the balance left for the United Kingdom Exchequer. The area itself gets no benefit from
this forbearance, and the concern which operates from the United Kingdom becomes the less attractive a concessionaire. Can it be right ... for this country to persist in a policy which has these results ...? [FN15]
The Commission determined that some accommodation for tax incentives offered by overseas countries was
appropriate for two reasons: first, Britain's responsibility for the economic development of its colonies, and second,
the possible damage to Britain's external relations if it failed to take the problem seriously. Interestingly, the Com-
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mission concluded that whether or not the overseas tax concessions were wise was unimportant given that they were
in fact being offered. [FN16] It decided that the appropriate instruments for preserving tax incentives were bilateral
agreements, and dismissed the idea of a general statutory provision out of fear that such a provision would be open
to abuse. [FN17]
*517 In 1953 and again in 1956, the British Parliament debated the Commission's recommendation on the use
of tax treaties to preserve overseas incentives. The focus of the 1953 debates was on the degree to which tax sparing
provisions should be limited to Commonwealth countries or extended to include other countries in need of economic
development. Although the urgency of the issue was stressed, the proposed clause was withdrawn for lack of consensus. [FN18] Three concerns dominated the 1956 debates: concerns about appropriate support for economic development in the colonial territories, about the ability of the U.K. government treasury to sacrifice revenues, and
about the potential lack of competitiveness of U.K. investors overseas if other high-income jurisdictions (particularly the United States) took similar steps to protect tax holidays granted by the U.K.'s colonial territories. [FN19] In
1957, the Chancellor of the Exchequer put an end to the discussion by rejecting the Commission's proposal. [FN20]
In 1961, although not the first country to do so, the United Kingdom did ratify a tax treaty (with Pakistan) that
included a tax sparing provision. [FN21] The U.K. has since been one of the most active jurisdictions in negotiating
tax sparing provisions, [FN22] including them in *518 forty-seven of its tax treaties. However, since 1999, no new
treaties have included tax sparing provisions.
It is difficult to say why the United Kingdom was historically so willing to agree to tax sparing provisions. Its
colonial past may have led it to believe it had a paternal interest in preserving tax incentives offered by its former
colonies or by countries with whom it had a close economic connection. For example, its treaties between 1970 and
1974 were with Barbados, Belize, Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya and Kiribati/Tuvalu. Each of these
countries, except Indonesia, has had a direct colonial relationship with Britain at some point, and although in the
colonial era Indonesia was generally subject to Dutch rule, there was extensive British influence and trade in the
region during that period.
B. Derailed in the United States, 1957
The first attempted use of a tax sparing provision in a tax treaty (and perhaps the most widely told tax sparing
story) was the failed provision in the tax treaty between Pakistan and the United States. [FN23] Bolstered by statements made by President Eisenhower in 1955, [FN24] the U.S. negotiated a tax treaty with Pakistan in 1957 which
gave U.S. domestic corporations a foreign tax credit for Pakistan taxes that would have been *519 paid were it not
for Pakistan's special tax incentive legislation. [FN25] The Treasury Department was very supportive of U.S. efforts
to conclude tax treaties with developing countries in the hope of building trade relations with some low-income
countries during the Cold War.
The Pakistan treaty was considered before the Senate in July and August, 1957. Both the Deputy to the Secretary of the Treasury, Dan Throop Smith, and Professor Stanley Surrey were invited to speak to the Senate. Although
Throop Smith was supportive of the tax sparing provision, [FN26] Surrey's remarks against the provision were powerfully phrased and included a warning to the Senators that tax sparing provisions were a clear break from previous
treaty policy because they allowed a reduction not only of American taxes owing by foreigners, but also of American taxes owing by Americans. [FN27] Surrey went on to articulate a list of reasons against tax sparing. Among
these, he argued that tax sparing provisions were counter to the approach taken in domestic tax legislation (enacted
by Congress) that opposed any corporate tax concessions for foreign income; that once this concession was granted
to one country, it would inevitably need to be granted to myriad other countries; that tax sparing provisions distorted
the tax credit mechanism; that tax sparing provisions were largely unnecessary given the deferral advantages offered
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to operations conducted in foreign jurisdictions in corporate subsidiary form; that tax sparing provisions encouraged
irrational and unstable foreign country tax design; and that they rewarded and encouraged corrupt practices by foreign governments. [FN28]
Ultimately, the U.S. Senate was persuaded by Surrey and refused to ratify the tax sparing provision in the Pakistan treaty. Although the *520 refusal to ratify was “without prejudice” for future treaties, the same story can be told
about the U.S. tax treaties negotiated with India, Israel and the United Arab Republic in the 1950s, each of which
included a tax sparing provision and failed to obtain Senate approval. [FN29] The negotiation of further tax treaties
that would include tax sparing provisions was precluded by the appointment of Stanley Surrey to Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury in 1961.
The United States Treasury Department has steadfastly maintained its position against tax sparing. [FN30] Despite this position, the U.S. does often agree, in an exchange of notes, to grant a tax sparing provision to countries
with whom it negotiates tax treaties if it ever grants such a provision to another country in a subsequent tax treaty.
[FN31] However, the U.S. has never entered into a tax treaty that contains a tax sparing provision, conveniently
making the offer of no real substance. [FN32]
There are a number of possible explanations for the U.S.'s steadfast refusal to grant tax sparing provisions. First,
Surrey's opposition was *521 highly influential. He was a widely recognized tax expert and many political players
seem to have been willing to follow his lead. Second, as a former colonial state itself, the U.S. may feel little obligation to protect the economic interests of other states. Third, as a capital-exporting country, the U.S. has always taken
a strong stance in favour of “investment at home.” Also, of course, because of its large potential capital-exporting
position, the United States has greater revenue loss concerns than many other countries. Finally, its position on tax
sparing provisions may reflect its general position in tax treaty negotiations: the U.S. has always been reluctant to
grant any concessions to low-income countries.
C. A Reluctant OECD, 1963
Serious analysis of the problems raised by the potential for international double tax began as early as the 1920s.
Most famously, the League of Nations commissioned four prominent public finance scholars to report on the issues.
However, neither their report, [FN33] nor any of the subsequent reports issued by groups of technical experts,
[FN34] explored the issue of whether one jurisdiction had any obligation to preserve the tax incentives provided by
another jurisdiction. Over the years, the League of Nations and related international organizations produced a number of additional reports and model international tax treaties, but none addressed tax sparing. In the late 1950s, concerned about the effect of tax uncertainty on the increasing amount of international trade and investment, the international business community persuaded the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (the OEEC, later the
OECD) to form a Fiscal Committee to explore the possibility of a uniform multilateral treaty that would avoid *522
double taxation. In 1963, the work of the Fiscal Committee culminated in the publication of the draft OECD model
bilateral income tax treaty.
Although at least some countries had included tax sparing provisions in their tax treaties by 1963 when the
OECD released its first model tax treaty, the OECD did not explicitly endorse the practice in its model. However,
the commentary to Article 23 of the 1963 model treaty -- the provision dealing with methods of relieving double
taxation -- recognized that there may have been some cases where a developing state sought to grant tax incentives.
In those cases, the model suggested that the developing country's treaty partner might consider either exempting
from tax the income from the activity that the developing country sought to encourage, or agreeing to a tax sparing
arrangement that would give credit for the amount of tax that would have been paid had no relief been granted.
[FN35] Under the commentary to Article 23, member states were free to settle the form of their tax sparing provi-
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sions. Even in the face of their lukewarm endorsement by the OECD, some countries were quick to include tax sparing provisions in their treaties with low-income countries. Among them was the U.K., which in 1975 had at least ten
treaties with tax sparing provisions.
Despite the increasing use of tax sparing provisions by many of its member states, with the notable exception of
the United States, the OECD has never formally embraced the use of tax sparing in its model. In its 1977 revised
model and commentary, the OECD enhanced its discussion of the use of tax sparing clauses in the commentary to
Article 23, [FN36] becoming more explicit about the need to draft the tax sparing provision carefully and to delimit
its scope. In particular, the OECD suggested three approaches to the design of the provision: (1) the residence state
could grant a credit for the amount of the tax that would have been paid had the source state not waived the tax
(classic “tax sparing”); (2) the residence state could give a credit for an amount of tax at a higher rate than that imposed by the source state (“matching credit”); or (3) the residence state could exempt the foreign income from *523
tax. Also new in 1977 was the suggestion that the relief from residence taxation could be made subject to rate limits
where the income subject to the incentive was dividends, interest or royalties, and the suggestion that tax sparing
provisions might be subject to time limits.
On first review, it may appear curious that the OECD model convention did not embrace tax sparing provisions
in its early days given that many OECD members were actively employing them in tax treaties. However, on further
reflection, the OECD's reluctance may not be so surprising. At least some member states did not tax foreign-earned
income, so tax sparing provisions were irrelevant for them. Also, the U.S. has always played a significant role in
setting the OECD's tax policy, and its strong opposition, particularly in that era, must have had some effect. Finally,
the OECD model convention was essentially drafted to apply between two high-income countries, and its effects on
low-income countries, while always well-known, have never been seriously taken into account in its drafting.
D. Canada Embraces Tax Sparing, 1966
Although the OECD failed to wholeheartedly endorse the use of tax sparing provisions in its model treaty, various countries continued to include tax sparing provisions in their tax treaties with low-income countries. The late
1970s to the late 1990s were a high-water period. Canada ratified its first tax sparing provision in 1966 with Ireland.
It ratified thirteen more from 1975 to 1979, [FN37] eleven from 1980 to 1984, [FN38] four from 1985 to 1989,
[FN39] two from 1990 to 1994, [FN40] and eight from 1995 to 1999, [FN41] for a total of 39.
*524 It is not surprising that Canada was later than the U.K. in granting tax sparing provisions. Canada's tax
credit for foreign taxes paid was first introduced in 1919 for Commonwealth countries and countries who granted a
reciprocal credit, and in 1944 it was extended to all countries (without the reciprocity requirement). [FN42] In contrast, until 1953, the U.K. provided only a restricted foreign tax credit for countries with whom it did not have a
double taxation agreement. [FN43] Thus, for some time, Canada's system for taxing foreign income was more generous than that of the U.K.
Nevertheless, Canada's willingness to grant tax sparing provisions is somewhat surprising, as it provides a generous exemption for foreign active business income earned through a foreign affiliate. Indeed, in the same year that
Canada granted its first tax sparing provision in a tax treaty, Alan Short, one of Canada's long-standing tax treaty
negotiators, argued that tax sparing was unlikely to be necessary since Canada already provided generous exemptions for dividends from foreign subsidiaries and affiliated companies. [FN44] Perhaps the willingness to grant tax
sparing provisions can be explained by the likelihood that Canada would lose little tax revenue by their introduction
given its comparatively small amount of foreign investment, its generous exemptions for foreign income and its historic role (particularly relative to its American neighbour) as a capital-importer. [FN45] This generally empathetic
attitude toward the aims of lower-income countries is illustrated by the brief reference to tax sparing in the 1966
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Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation. In noting that the proposal for the treatment of foreign income would
“neutralize” tax concessions granted by low-income countries, the Commission suggested that tax sparing provisions
might be used on a country-by-country basis through tax *525 treaties to assist low-income countries who seek to
encourage legitimate investment. [FN46]
E. Australia Adopts Tax Sparing, 1967
Australia ratified its first treaty with a tax sparing provision in 1967 with Singapore. [FN47] Prior to 1975, tax
sparing provisions were of limited importance in Australia, largely because it had an exemption system for foreignearned income. However, in 1975, the Asprey Report by Australia's Taxation Review Committee recommended a
move to a credit-based system. [FN48] The Report noted that the special tax incentives that some developing countries might provide to attract Australian businesses would be negated by this change in Australia's international tax
policy. However, the Report concluded that tax sparing should only apply where the tax system was likely to provide better encouragement for the activity in question than any other possible mechanism, and that where a tax sparing provision was adopted, its design should be specific and explicit. [FN49] The fact that Australia has implemented tax sparing provisions in its treaties to a lesser extent than either the United Kingdom or Canada may be
explained in part by its history as an *526 exemption jurisdiction, but perhaps also by the early cautions reflected in
the Asprey Report. [FN50]
F. The United Nations Equivocates, 1980
Shortly after the release of the 1963 OECD draft model convention, the UN Economic and Social Council, concerned about the bias toward high-income countries inherent in that convention, began a study of the principles that
should underlie tax treaties between developed and developing countries. In part to address some broad concerns
about the implications that tax treaties based on the OECD model convention would have on the revenue base of
low-income countries, in 1967 the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations established the Ad Hoc
Group of Experts on Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries. That Group had representatives
from ten developed and ten developing countries, [FN51] and it worked throughout the 1970s toward a UN model
treaty. As documented earlier in this paper, there were clear differences of views about the efficacy of a tax sparing
provision. In 1974, the Group concluded:
The problem of tax sparing was one of the important issues before this Group, which expressed strong support
for this method, designed to avoid a nullification of incentives given by the host country to the foreign investor.
However, the Group abided by the recommendation of the Secretariat that alternatives should be considered, because not all developed countries considered it appropriate to grant a credit for a tax spared. [FN52]
*527 The UN model treaty was released in 1980. Although it was designed to be more favourable to lowincome countries, it did not go so far as to support tax sparing provisions. Indeed, the commentary of the UN model
treaty simply adopted in its entirety the commentary on the 1977 OECD model treaty. [FN53]
The closest the United Nations came to endorsing tax sparing was in the observations to the 1980 UN model
convention, which notes that “the most effective method of preserving the effects of the tax incentives and concessions extended by developing countries would be the application of a tax sparing credit.” [FN54]
When the draft UN model treaty was released in 1979, the absence of an express provision on tax sparing arrangements was interpreted by numerous commentators to reflect either a continued bias in favour of high-income
countries or a failure of those countries to appreciate the distinct needs of low-income countries. [FN55]
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*528 G. The Return of the OECD, 1998
The increased use of tax sparing provisions which had occurred through the 1970s, '80s and '90s, (at least in the
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia) came to an end in 1998, when the OECD released a report on the subject.
[FN56] That report did not argue outright that tax sparing provisions should be adandoned, but it urged a reconsideration of their use for a number of reasons: the increase in standards of living in many non-OECD countries; the
reported ineffectiveness of tax incentives in promoting foreign investment (as documented in the OECD's 1995 report on the taxation of foreign direct investment); and a concern about the concessions that non-OECD countries had
made to obtain tax sparing provisions (for example, reducing their withholding tax rates). [FN57] After reviewing
the arguments against tax sparing provisions, [FN58] the OECD report made several recommendations for best practices in their use. [FN59]
In the light of its 1998 report, in 2000 the OECD modified its commentary on tax sparing. [FN60] While some
of it remained the same, *529 including that on possible methods of granting tax sparing, much of it was adjusted to
reflect the conclusions of the 1998 report. In particular, the 2000 commentary warned that tax sparing is “very vulnerable to taxpayer abuse,” [FN61] that it may not be effective in promoting development [FN62] and that it may
erode the tax bases of other countries. [FN63] Finally, it recommended that tax sparing be used only where the economic level of the country to which the sparing is granted is significantly below that of the OECD country. [FN64]
Nevertheless, several non-member countries continue to assert their right to include tax sparing provisions in their
treaties. [FN65]
It is difficult to ascertain whether this reconsideration by the OECD led to a change in treaty negotiation policy
on the part of such countries as the U.K., Canada and Australia, or whether changing attitudes in those countries
about the effectiveness of tax sparing provisions led to the OECD reconsideration. The U.K. entered into its last
treaty with a tax sparing clause in 1997, Canada in 2002 and Australia in 1999. Given the proximity of these dates to
the release of the OECD's 1998 reconsideration, it appears that the OECD's initiative influenced the approach of
those three countries, and not the reverse.
Perhaps because of the influence of the OECD model and 1998 OECD report on the UN model itself, nothing
on tax sparing was added to the 2001 revision and re-release of the UN model convention, despite the widespread
use of tax sparing provisions by low-income UN *530 member states in the 1980s and 1990s. [FN66] Indeed, the
commentary on tax sparing in the 2001 revision is identical to that in the 1980 UN model convention. [FN67] As it
had done before the release of the 1980 model convention, the UN Group of Experts simply decided that, because of
its internal difference of opinion about the effectiveness of tax sparing provisions, nothing on the matter would be
added to the UN model treaty. [FN68]
H. The Stall, 2000
The 1998 OECD report and the revisions to the model convention have clearly had a significant impact on
member states' willingness to grant tax sparing provisions. As noted above, since the release of the report, Australia,
for example, has not granted any tax sparing provisions in its tax treaties. Canada has taken the position that, generally speaking, it will not grant tax sparing provisions in its tax treaties, and where it does, a short sunset period will
be applied. Indeed, Canada has granted only one tax sparing provision since 2000 -- to Mongolia -- with a three-year
sunset period. Even the United Kingdom, despite its early enthusiasm, has not granted a tax sparing provision in a
treaty since 1997.
Despite the emerging consensus among OECD countries against tax sparing provisions, many low-income
countries and tax commentators continue to bemoan their absence from the international tax policy agenda of high-
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income states. Although one might conclude that we are entering a period where their use is less likely, all it would
take to reverse this trend is a proposal to end deferral on active business income of subsidiaries, a shift away from
territorial taxation by some of the *531 major OECD countries which continue to take that approach to defining
their tax base, [FN69] or a renewed intellectual commitment to increasing foreign investment in low-income countries through the use of tax incentives. These factors seem to have been the dominant drivers of countries' decisions
to include tax sparing provisions in their treaties. A renewal of interest in tax sparing provisions is likely, given the
OECD's tax policy studies report, issued in 2007, which suggests that tax incentives are more effective now than in
the past. [FN70]
II. The Case against Tax Incentives
The case for tax sparing rests squarely on the efficacy of business tax incentives in low-income countries. If
such incentives are costly and do little to achieve the economic development objectives of those countries, it would
be odd for high-income countries to negotiate tax treaty provisions that encourage their use. This part of the paper is
divided into four sections. The first reviews the justification for tax incentives in low-income countries. The second
refers to the theory and empirical evidence on their effectiveness in attracting foreign direct investment. The third
enumerates the serious costs of enacting tax incentives. The fourth offers possible explanations for their continued
popularity. The conclusion is that while there is some recent empirical evidence that tax incentives might be somewhat effective in attracting new investment, the costs they impose on low-income countries outweigh the benefits.
A. The Misguided Case for Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment
(i) The Justification for Tax Incentives
In free market economies, the normal assumption is that the market will allocate resources to their most productive use -- that government *532 interference with investment decisions, by favouring some investments over others,
will impair the efficient allocation of capital and the long-run prosperity of the economy. However, even if this general proposition is accepted, supporters of tax incentives make a number of arguments in support of their use to correct market failures in low-income countries: that foreign direct investments generate positive externalities in those
countries; that tax incentives are necessary to compensate for information inadequacies in their capital markets; and
that tax incentives signal that the country is open for investment and compensate for deficiencies in the general investment climate. [FN71] Since their purpose is to distort investment decisions, it is not a criticism of tax incentives
to acknowledge that they do this. [FN72] However, some justification must still be given for such distortions.
*533 (a) Positive Externalities
Some commentators argue that foreign direct investment in low-income countries should be subsidized because
it has external benefits: that is, benefits beyond the rate of return earned by the investor. Thus, relying on the marketplace rate of return alone will not bring the optimal amount of such investment to those countries. In addition to
supplying capital, it is claimed that foreign direct investment benefits the economy and local firms generally by,
among other things, stimulating competition, increasing the skill level of workers, introducing new technologies and
transferring knowledge on quality control and advanced management techniques. Tax incentives justified on this
basis would typically include those given to the following types of projects: those located in less developed regions
of a country, either to reduce congestion or pollution in the developed regions or to reduce income disparities; those
which use advanced technologies and which could raise the general technological absorption capacity of a country;
those which lead to the development of human capital; and those which involve research and development. In such
cases, an economic justification in the classic Pigouvian tradition can be made for tax incentives as a corrective policy instrument.
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The difficulty with this argument is that these positive spillover effects, although compelling in theory, are difficult to find in practice. [FN73] As Dani Rodrik has noted, “Today's policy literature is filled with extravagant claims
about positive spillovers from [FDI but] ... the hard evidence is sobering.” [FN74] Also, even if such effects exist, to
realize them would require the careful targeting of investments. At a minimum, the evidence suggests that to be effective in generating these externalities, such investment must be coupled with infrastructure development, stable
political climates and an educated and healthy workforce. [FN75] *534 Finally, even to the extent that some positive
externalities might be generated by such investment, there is a significant revenue loss involved in providing the tax
incentives. This loss, and the other costs enumerated below, will very likely outweigh any positive spillovers.
[FN76]
(b) Information Inadequacies
It is sometimes also claimed that tax incentives are necessary to correct information inadequacies that lead to
underinvestment in the economies of low-income countries, and which may cause markets to be incomplete because,
for example, they result in liquidity constraints or distortions in labour markets. [FN77] Such inadequacies may result from the fact that high-income country investors simply cannot see that investment in the low-income country
would lead to a higher market return than investment elsewhere, or they may result from discrimination by those
investors. [FN78] Presumably the most effective way of combating investors' non-market biases against low-income
countries is for high-income countries to provide accurate, unbiased information about the suitability of particular
low-income markets, or to directly correct such biases in other ways. In addition, in a period of *535 unprecedented
capital mobility, it is hard to imagine that investors would not work hard to get sufficient information about foreign
jurisdictions to know whether extra-normal rents might be earned from investment there.
(c) Compensating for Deficiencies in Investment Climate
Another common justification for tax incentives is that attractive fiscal benefits are essential to gain the interest
of investors who are deterred by perceived adverse social and economic conditions in low-income countries. To
some extent, tax incentives can offset the lack of infrastructure, complicated or antiquated laws, and bureaucratic
complexities and weak administration in the tax area or elsewhere. If these are the reasons for insufficient foreign
investment, the appropriate solution is to reform the existing laws and build the necessary administrative capacities
and infrastructure. Because this is often easier said than done, tax incentives may seem necessary to provide temporary relief until the more fundamental reforms have been carried out. However, unless the investment climate disadvantage is relatively marginal, tax incentives are unlikely to counteract these negative factors.
(ii) The Effectiveness of Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence
The effect of tax incentives on foreign direct investment has been the subject of countless empirical studies of
various types: econometric studies, surveys of corporate officials involved in investment locations decisions and
case studies focused on the experience of particular countries with tax incentives. Even the synthesis and metaanalysis of the results of these studies has proliferated.
Traditionally, surveys of corporate executives [FN79] and case studies [FN80] have suggested that tax incentives are generally ineffective in attracting *536 new investment. However, the results of the econometric studies are
mixed. In an often cited survey of studies in the late 1990s, James Hines concluded that foreign investment was
quite sensitive to tax policies. [FN81] Other reviews of the same and more recent literature generally conclude that
while there is some evidence that tax incentives attract investment, the size of the effect remains unclear. [FN82]
The effects of tax incentives on growth are notoriously hard to measure, in part because there are so many independ-
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ent variables to control for. [FN83] Nevertheless, on the basis of this research, most international economic and aid
organizations have opposed the use of tax incentives by low-income countries. [FN84]
*537 In theory, it is easy to see why tax incentives in low-income countries might have little impact on where
multinationals invest. Multinationals invest in locations where they can earn the highest risk-adjusted rate of return.
In any country, a myriad of factors influence the rate of return to direct investment, including these: the distance to
major markets; the proximity to raw materials; the climate; the size of the local market; the quality of the infrastructure, particularly transportation, telecommunications, energy and water; the state of property and contract laws,
which determine the costs of transacting; the extent of corruption, which in some low-income countries imposes a
heavy implicit tax on business; the skill and reliability of the workforce, which in turn depends on good education
and health services; the costs of complying with regulations and other government procedures, including the costs of
dealing with inefficient civil servants and meddling government officials; and the extent of customs duties and other
barriers to international trade.
The perceived risk of an investment depends on an equally long list of factors, including these: the macroeconomic stability of the country, including the inflation rate, the size of any budget deficit and the stability of the real
exchange rate; the general security of property rights and the enforcability of contracts, which depend on an effective and unbiased police force and judicial system; the extent of bureaucratic discretion in law enforcement; the risk
of financial crises brought on by inadequate regulation and supervision of the financial sector; whether capital and
profits can be repatriated without restrictions; and whether *538 political stability is put at risk by the failure to respect human rights or the lack of participatory governance.
Because there are so many fundamental factors that might affect the expected rate of return and the risk of investing in low-income countries, tax laws are unlikely to be of overriding significance, particularly if they are certain, transparent, stable and fairly administered. Moreover, in view of the overriding influence of non-tax factors, tax
considerations could at most affect only a relatively small number of marginal investments. It would be impossible
to target a tax incentive only at those investments.
In specific cases, other factors further reduce the effect of tax incentives in encouraging investment in lowincome countries. The natural resources and location of some countries means that multinationals are likely to be
able to earn rates of return that are substantially above normal. In theory, so long as taxes do not completely erode
these economic rents, they will not deter investment in those jurisdictions. Also, some businesses that invest in lowincome countries will not be able to make full use of tax incentives because, for example, they have loss carryforwards, they will realize considerable start-up losses or their home country's tax system will neutralize the effect
of the tax incentive. Moreover, if an incentive is to be of any benefit to an investor, it must increase the investor's
after-tax profits. In some cases, that will not happen because the tax savings will be passed on to consumers of the
end products in the form of lower prices or to suppliers of capital goods in the form of higher prices.
(iii) The Costs of Tax Incentives
Recent empirical studies suggest that tax incentives for foreign investment likely have some effect in attracting
new investment. [FN85] Even if this is true, tax incentives impose a number of serious costs on the economy and the
tax system of the low-income country -- costs that will usually dwarf whatever benefit they might bring to that country but which sometimes appear to be overlooked or discounted by the *539 authors of studies on tax incentives and
by countries which enact such incentives. Therefore, those costs will be reviewed here in some detail.
(a) They Cause Revenue Losses
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The most obvious and also most important cost of tax incentives is lost revenue. Most low-income countries
face a critical need to enhance tax collections to finance urgent demands for public services, including those that
everyone agrees are essential to economic growth and social welfare, such as education, health, public security, legal
and judicial systems, and economic infrastructure.
It is occasionally argued that if properly structured, tax incentives will not lead to revenue loss -- that if a foreign investment which is attracted by a tax incentive would not otherwise have come, there is no direct revenue loss.
This might conceivably be true where an investment would be equally viable in two countries with similar cost factors, and a tax incentive tips the balance in favour of one of them. Or it might occur where the investment would not
be viable but for the tax incentive. However, it would be a rare case where a tax incentive provided the precise
amount of subsidy required to attract an investment in either of those scenarios. It is more likely that an incentive
will cover many cases, particularly highly profitable ones, in which the investment would have been made in the
country for other reasons, without the incentive. In these cases, the revenue cost is the full amount of the foregone
tax, which is a pure windfall to the multinational. In other cases, the incentive might be partly responsible for the
investment, but is more generous than was necessary to attract it. In this case, the revenue cost is some portion of the
foregone taxes.
In addition, all tax incentive programs have substantial indirect revenue costs. These costs arise from a number
of sources: from the fact that tax-favoured firms might undercut the profitability of other producers who do pay
taxes, by bidding away customers or bidding up the price of skilled labour and raw materials; from increased tax
avoidance and tax evasion; from political pressure to extend the *540 incentive (for example, to domestic firms);
[FN86] and from less effective tax collection because of the need to divert administrative resources to administering
the tax incentives.
The revenue losses caused by tax incentives will, in most cases, make them counterproductive. If the loss is
compensated for by cutting funding for public goods and services, it will reduce productivity in the long run. If it is
made up for by higher taxes on other productive activities, it will impair growth in those areas of the economy. And
if the government makes up the revenue loss through other sources of financing, such as increasing the deficit or
printing money, the negative macroeconomic effects could easily overwhelm any positive effects of the tax incentives.
(b) They Foster a Sense of Unfairness
A significant cost of tax incentives results from the sense of unfairness they engender. Tax incentives for foreign direct investment invariably benefit large multinational corporations. Although tax-induced investments made
by these corporations allegedly lead to a more productive and prosperous economy that benefits all citizens, to domestic taxpayers this link may be obscure. This is particularly true if the tax incentives mean that less revenue
comes from corporate taxes and that more must be raised through regressive sales and excise taxes, which fall directly and immediately on individuals. Domestic firms will also undoubtedly feel discriminated against by tax incentives that benefit *541 large foreign firms. Low-income countries often struggle to establish the legitimacy and acceptability of their tax system. Insofar as tax incentives reduce the perceived fairness of that system, they are likely
to provide one more rationalization for taxpayers to cheat in reporting their income.
(c) They Introduce Unintended Economic Distortions
Tax incentives are intended to distort investment decisions by attracting more investment to the host country
than it would otherwise receive. But even if there is some justification for this intentional distortion, tax incentives
also have a number of unintended distortionary effects that reduce efficiency and productivity. [FN87]
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• Tax-induced investments may discourage other investments that would have a higher rate of return
were it not for the tax incentive. [FN88] If the incentives are given only to foreign firms, this might have the
perverse effect of driving competing, more productive domestic firms out of business.
• Tax incentives frequently favour capital-intensive over labour-intensive investments, thereby reducing
job creation.
• Because tax incentives frequently favour short-term over long-term investments, they tend to attract
footloose projects that are less likely to lead to extensive knowledge transfer and to other beneficial spillover
effects that can easily move elsewhere when the tax incentives run their course.
• To the extent that tax incentives lead to revenue loss and thus drive up the tax rates on other economic
activitity, they will cause distortions elsewhere in the economy that would not occur with a lower, equal tax
rate.
*542 (d) They Provide Opportunities for Avoidance and Evasion
As is well known among tax analysts, almost any departure from a comprehensive tax base can lead to tax
avoidance planning. Every type of tax incentive provides clear opportunities for tax avoidance gambits. Tax holidays are notoriously subject to company “churning,” “round tripping” and “income shifting.” If a particular tax holiday applies only to new firms and for only a limited time, existing firms will “churn” their assets by closing down
part or all of their operations and establishing a new company that qualifies for the tax holiday. A similar strategy
can be used when the holiday period expires for a particular company. If the holiday applies to only foreign firms,
domestic enterprises will engage in “round tripping” by channeling their investments through holding companies
incorporated in foreign jurisdictions with strict secrecy laws. If a corporation that is entitled to a tax incentive is related in some way to another corporation in the jurisdiction that is not entitled to the incentive, the latter corporation
will arrange to shift its income to the former. Several well-known arrangements can be used for this purpose, including the manipulation of transfer prices on goods and services exchanged between the companies, inter-corporate
loans at above-market rates, excessive management fees and royalty charges, and the sale and leaseback of depreciable property. [FN89]
If the tax incentives take the form of an upfront incentive based, for example, on the cost of eligible property,
firms will use transfer-pricing arrangements to increase the cost of the assets, they will use finance leasing and other
arrangements to transfer the tax advantages to firms that can best use the incentive, and they will sell and purchase
the same asset in order to produce multiple access to the incentive. The legislation governing the tax holidays can
attempt to prevent these well-known tax avoidance strategies by drafting specific and general anti-avoidance rules.
However, enforcement of such rules is extremely difficult, and is often beyond the limited resources of tax departments in low-income countries.
*543 (e) They Complicate the Tax System and Introduce Uncertainty
Multinationals report that one of the most important factors they consider before investing in a country is the
predictability and stability of the tax system. If it is difficult to discern the precise rules, or if the rules are not stable,
corporations will demand a greater risk return before investing. Moreover, potential investors look not only to their
own tax liability, but also to the tax their competitors will pay. They will want assurances that competitors who may
enter the market later will not be given tax benefits to which they themselves were not entitled. Complicated and
uncertain tax systems also increase the cost of compliance and the incidence of conflict with taxpayers. Because tax
incentives often turn on arbitrary and ambiguous distinctions and inevitably lead to a steady stream of antiavoidance measures, they are a substantial contributor to increased complexity.
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(f) They Consume Administrative Resources
The central task of tax departments in low-income countries should be to collect desperately needed revenue.
Tax incentives impede this task in several ways. First, they divert the efforts of tax administrators toward delivering
tax subsidies -- toward ensuring that applicants qualify for the incentives, that their activities are monitored and that
tax offsets are correctly claimed. Second, the fact that different rules apply to different taxpayers complicates the
interpretation of the legislation, the collection of tax return information and the ability to automate the tax system.
Third, even where a corporation is entitled to a tax holiday, tax authorities still have to audit its books and records to
verify that asset purchases, depreciation charges and other accounts are not improperly reported in a way that would
lower its taxes after the holiday period. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, tax incentives consume administrative resources that must be devoted to preventing incentive-related tax avoidance activity. Given the difficulty of
recruiting, training and retaining tax officials in low-income countries, it would seem imperative that the efforts of
the most skilled members of *544 the department be devoted to the central function of raising revenue, rather than to
more peripheral tasks. [FN90]
(g) They Lead to Corruption
It is widely agreed that one of the most serious tax administration problems in low-income countries, and indeed
one of the most significant barriers to development in these countries, is corruption. [FN91] Low-paid tax officials
are often easy targets for taxpayers willing to engage in illegal transactions to reduce their tax liabilities. Tax incentives, which often involve substantial cash values, arc an open inducement to bribery and corruption. Approvals are
sometimes discretionary, and even when they are not, the criteria for eligibility are often vague and ambiguous.
Moreover, tax returns are usually confidential, and the controls for verifying the work of auditors are weak. In a
widely cited study of the determinants of foreign direct investments that focused on corruption, Shang-Jin Wei concluded that “[a]n increase in corruption from the Singapore level to the Mexico level would have the same negative
effect on inward FDI as raising the corporate income tax rate by eighteen percentage points.” [FN92]
(h) They Lead to Unproductive Rent-Seeking Activity
Because tax incentives can give rise to large savings, multinationals have strong motivation to lobby for their
enactment. In fact, it has been observed that in many countries, tax incentives reflect the political strength of competing interest groups more than they reflect a dispassionate assessment of the economic costs and benefits. Once a
*545 particular incentive has been enacted, similar incentives tend to proliferate as other pressure groups lobby for
similar treatment. In addition, political realities mean that even though incentives may initially be enacted for a limited time, they are usually extended because an identifiable and easily organized clientele will have a stake in their
continuation and spread. [FN93]
As well as distorting economic policy, lobbying activities that seek to sustain or increase tax expenditures themselves represent a loss of economic efficiency because companies devote resources to seeking profit through political influence instead of through higher productivity and improved product quality. Tax incentives also distract policymakers and politicians from more difficult economic reforms, such as those needed for improved macroeconomic
conditions, better infrastructure and a more highly educated and trained work force -- reforms that will have a larger
impact on foreign investment in the long run. [FN94]
(i) They Lead to Wasteful Tax Competition
Low-income countries frequently claim that they must enact tax incentives for foreign investment in order to
compete with other countries in their region. In his study of duty-free zones and special economic zones in central
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and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Alex Easson found the following:
Perhaps the most important influence on a country's policy toward the creation of special tax zones is what its
neighbours are doing. As we have seen, the creation of special economic zones in Poland may have been a factor in
Hungary's decision to establish further zones in its less-developed regions. Poland's actions may, in turn, have been
taken as a response to the perception that Hungary's comparative success in attracting foreign investment was in part
due to its more generous tax incentives. The Czech Republic is *546 now contemplating the introduction of tax incentives, fearing that otherwise it will not compete with its neighbors. [FN95]
This kind of tax competition should of course be discouraged. It means that any new investment in a lowincome country simply comes at the expense of other low-income countries, and that all are worse off. [FN96]
(iv) Explaining the Apparent Popularity of Tax Incentives
In spite of the costs of tax incentives, officials and politicians from low-income countries often appear to be
their strongest supporters. They insist that such incentives are critical to the economic development of their countries. A number of obvious factors likely explain the popularity of tax incentives in low-income countries. [FN97]
• Multinationals put continuous pressure on developing countries to enact tax incentives. Moreover, multinationals negotiate with individual countries over tax incentives and may play those countries off against
each other. A company that promises to locate in a particular country if it receives a tax break may merely be
trying to improve its bargaining position with another country where it really intends to locate. Large accounting firms and other lobbying groups maintain a catalogue of incentives provided in each country, and
they use this information to persuade neighbouring countries to offer *547 similar incentives. When a multinational decides not to locate in a country, it can easily claim that the reason was a lack of tax incentives.
Such stories of lost investment, and of incentives offered by neighboring countries, are likely to leave an indelible impression on local politicians.
• Foreign investment promotion agencies in developing countries often have an interest in the enactment
of tax incentives. Those agencies are unlikely to bear the costs of the tax incentives, and their enactment may
appear to legitimize an agency's work and increase its bureaucratic power.
• Because the real economic cost of tax incentives is difficult to measure and is usually not transparent,
political resistance to their enactment is likely to be much less than to the enactment of alternative policy instruments.
• Factors that will undoubtedly increase foreign direct investment, such as creating a well-educated
workforce and efficient infrastructure and reducing corruption, are very long-term goals, often far beyond the
horizon for policy makers. Tax incentives, by contrast, can be enacted immediately and can make it appear
that those politicians are coming to grips with current problems.
• The potential benefits of tax incentives are easy to understand, while their many costs are often indirect
and hard to evaluate.
Given these factors, it is not surprising that bureaucrats and politicians in low-income countries champion tax
incentives, in spite of their well-documented shortcomings.
III. The Case for and against Using Tax Sparing Provisions To Preserve Tax Incentives
The arguments above suggest that low-income countries should not enact tax incentives in an attempt to attract
foreign investment. However, if they do, then a different set of considerations bear on whether they should try to
maximize the effectiveness of these incentives by negotiating tax sparing provisions in their tax treaties. *548 This
part of the paper reviews the arguments frequently made for and against tax sparing provisions.
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A. Arguments Supporting Tax Sparing
(i) Levels the Playing Field for Multinationals
Multinationals often urge their high-income resident countries to grant tax sparing provisions so that when they
invest in low-income countries, they are not disadvantaged compared to competitors resident in countries that do
agree to such provisions. [FN98] If, for example, Canada agrees to a tax sparing provision in its treaty with Brazil,
but the U.S. does not, the cost to investing in Brazil will be lower for Canadian investors than for American investors.
Although this argument is undoubtedly true, taxpayers investing abroad always incur relative advantages and
disadvatanges from their home jurisdiction's tax base and tax rate choices. Other factors are likely much more significant than tax sparing in giving a country's multinationals a competitive edge in international investment markets
-- for example, its general tax treatment of foreign-source income and *549 foreign taxes; its allocation of interest
and head office expenses; and its treatment of loans between affiliates, un-repatriated earnings, and research and
development expenditures. If taken seriously, the argument suggests that whenever a multinational could point to a
tax rule in some foreign country which gave it an advantage over the rules of its resident country, the rules of the
resident country should be changed. The only logical end to this argument is no tax at all.
(ii) Avoids the Paternalism of Foreign Aid
If the tax that the capital-exporting country gives up through the operation of tax sparing provisions is regarded
as aid to the capital-importing country, the argument can be made that it avoids the paternalism often inherent in
direct grant programs for foreign aid administered by high-income countries. Direct aid or debt relief programs are
well-known to have extensive reporting requirements and specific targets. In contrast, at least in theory, tax incentives preserved by tax sparing provisions can be designed, chosen and fully implemented by the low-income country
without what might be seen as paternalistic interference by the high-income country. However, this is not so much
an argument in favour of tax sparing provisions as it is an argument against attempts by high-income countries to
use foreign aid programs to direct the growth and investment patterns of low-income countries.
(iii) Respects the Sovereignty of Low-income Countries
Some commentators argue that failing to provide for tax sparing in treaties curtails the sovereignty of lowincome countries because it prevents them from offering tax incentives for foreign investment (or at least neutralizes
the effect of such incentives). [FN99] There are two responses *550 to this argument. First, deciding not to support
tax sparing provisions in a tax treaty is very unlikely to force low-income countries not to use tax incentives. In most
cases, it will just reduce the incentive for enterprises operating in those countries to repatriate profits to their home
jurisdictions. Second, refusing to put tax sparing provisions into tax treaties may actually enhance the independent
decision-making capacities of low-income nations by making it easier for them to develop their international tax
systems in a manner that best meets their domestic needs. Instead of feeling pressured by non-resident multinationals to provide targeted incentives, the low-income country may feel free, for example, to provide a lower tax rate for
all domestic and international businesses. Finally, while the sovereignty of low-income countries should be respected, high-income countries also have the sovereign right to determine how they should tax their own residents.
[FN100]
The sovereignty argument sometimes focuses on the symbolic value of tax sparing provisions -- their value as a
signal to low-income countries that high-income countries respect their tax regimes and incentive programs.
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[FN101] However, high-income countries have a moral obligation to low-income countries to do much more than
make symbolic gestures. If all high-income countries refused to grant tax sparing provisions, and otherwise fashioned their tax systems in a way that discouraged low-income countries from competing among themselves for foreign direct investment, the latter countries might have less fear of broadening their tax bases and raising their corporate tax *551 rates closer to those of high-income countries. [FN102] This would facilitate the revenue-raising aims
of income tax systems in low-income countries, many of which rely largely on income taxes collected from foreigners. High-income countries that are serious about achieving economic and social equality between nations should
worry more about advancing the revenue-raising capacity of low-income countries and less about preserving their
own tax incentive decisions.
(iv) Maintains Neutrality between Tax Incentives and Direct Grants
Some argue that tax sparing provisions are necessary to maintain the equivalence between direct grants to foreign businesses by low-income governments and tax expenditures by those governments. [FN103] Direct subsidies
and tax subsidies are functional equivalents. Therefore, the tax consequences of receiving a direct subsidy should be
identical to those of receiving a tax subsidy. However, unless foreign domestic tax regimes are altered, tax sparing
provides a different tax result than a direct subsidy of the same amount. [FN104]
Generally speaking, if a low-income government provides a direct grant to a business operating in its jurisdiction, some portion of that direct grant is subject to tax, either because it is directly included in the taxable income of
the business or because it reduces the cost of a depreciable asset to which the grant relates. If the corporation is resident in a capital-exporting country that provides a foreign tax credit, its taxes levied on the amount of the grant will
be reduced by the amount of tax that was paid in the low-income country. If the low-income government provides
the same grant through the tax system, and no tax sparing provision prevents high-income country taxation, then,
generally speaking, the entire grant is taxed by the high-income country. Thus, *552 without tax sparing, there is a
significant after-tax difference between a direct grant and a tax expenditure. This interaction of the tax systems biases the low-income country in favour of direct grants. Many would argue that this bias at least runs in the right direction -- that countries should be encouraged to provide business assistance not by tax expenditures but by direct
grants, for which they tend to be more accountable. More importantly however, tax sparing overcorrects for this
bias. With tax sparing, the tax expenditure is completely free of the resident country's tax. In theory, to make the tax
expenditure equivalent to the grant, the resident country should include the value of the tax expenditure in the corporation's income and provide a tax credit for any source tax paid. The tax outcomes could be made uniform with
changes to the tax credit mechanism [FN105] or with changes to the tax sparing mechanism, [FN106] but in the absence of such reforms, tax sparing does not lead to a more neutral or equitable result.
(v) Necessary to Conclude Treaties with Low-income Countries
Finally, it is sometimes claimed that if high-income countries do not include tax sparing provisions in their treaties, low-income countries will not conclude treaties with them. The U.S. refuses to negotiate tax sparing provisions,
and the fact that it has relatively few treaties with developing countries is often used to support this argument.
[FN107]
There are two reasons why this concern may not be significant. First, it is not clear that the refusal to negotiate
tax sparing provisions has held up many tax treaties with low-income countries; other provisions are often more
important to developing countries. For example, while tax sparing appears to have been a major issue delaying *553
the tax treaty between the United States and Brazil, an equally important obstacle has been the tax treatment of fees
for technical services. [FN108] In other words, tax sparing is just one of many issues that must be resolved before a
tax treaty can be concluded, and it is probably seldom (if ever) the deal breaker. [FN109] Second, for at least some
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countries, tax sparing may be of particular significance only in limited circumstances. For example, in the Canadian
context, active business profits of a foreign affiliate earned in a country with which Canada has a tax treaty can be
repatriated tax-free as exempt surplus, so tax sparing provisions to exempt this form of income are unnecessary.
Moreover, it is much less important to low-income countries to negotiate a tax sparing provision with Canada than it
is to conclude a treaty (either a tax treaty or a tax information exchange agreement) so that business income earned
by Canadian corporations in those countries can be repatriated to Canada free of tax. [FN110]
B. The Arguments against Tax Sparing
In the section above, it was suggested that the arguments often given in favour of tax sparing provisions, and the
reasons why high-income countries should be willing to negotiate them with low-income countries, are not particularly compelling. Even if one accepts that there is a case to be made for tax incentives in low-income countries, this
section argues that tax sparing provisions create so many difficulties that they should not be negotiated.
*554 (i) Infringes Export Neutrality
There is a widely accepted international tax principle of capital export neutrality. Under this principle, there are
reasons to provide particular incentives; a country's international tax rules should seek to provide an environment
where its resident's investment decisions are made without tax bias in favour of domestic or foreign investment.
[FN111] Although this principle of capital export neutrality is frequently violated, and no one would argue that it
should be strictly applied, it provides the traditional baseline in thinking about international tax rules. But it is obviously infringed by tax-sparing provisions, and such an infringement requires justification. [FN112] The arguments
in favour of tax sparing provisions would have to be compelling in order to overcome the principle of capital export
neutrality.
(ii) Unnecessary
Although this point has been made a number of times above, tax sparing provisions are in most cases simply
unnecessary. Tax incentives provided by low-income countries will in most cases be effective without a tax sparing
provision for these reasons: they will benefit all multinationals resident in countries which tax international income
on a territorial basis (as many European countries do); they will also benefit all multinationals resident in countries
with exemption systems (like *555 Canada), if those multinationals incorporate a subsidiary in the low-income
country; and they will provide a deferral to all multinationals resident in countries (like the U.S.) which defer tax on
overseas income until that income is repatriated.
(iii) Provides Needless Tax Planning Opportunities
Tax sparing agreements are notoriously abused through aggressive tax planning strategies. Relieving enterprises
that engage in particular types of activities from taxation when other activities are taxed inevitably gives taxpayers
an incentive to characterize their activities as being among those that are tax-free. [FN113] Policing the boundaries
of tax sparing provisions inevitably creates administrative burdens, both for the low-income country, which is bound
to forgive a tax that would otherwise be payable, and for the high-income country, which will need to consider
whether the enterprise properly qualifies for the incentive. Sunset periods on tax sparing provisions present additional policing problems and can result in the manipulation of payments to be made near the commencement date or
termination date of the provision. For example, activities that would generate revenue immediately before the tax
sparing clause comes into effect may be deferred, and activities that would generate revenue closely following its
termination may be accelerated. This kind of timing manipulation is relatively easy to do, and it abuses the source
country's tax regime.
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(iv) Encourages Remittances Rather than Reinvestments
Tax sparing creates a bias in favour of the remittance of profits over reinvestment in the host country, and this
encourages short-term investments. [FN114] Under most high-income country tax regimes, if the *556 income
earned in the low-income country is business income earned through a subsidiary, and that income is not subject to a
tax sparing agreement but instead is simply subject to a lower rate of tax in the low-income country, the investor has
an incentive to reinvest the income in the low-income country. However, once investors are given the opportunity to
repatriate profits and receive a tax credit for taxes not paid, that bias in favour of reinvestment is removed. Although
the efficiency of such a bias might be questioned, presumably it makes more sense, as a mechanism for development, to encourage reinvestment in low-income countries.
(v) Subverts Sensible Treaty Negotiations
In order to obtain a tax sparing concession in a tax treaty, low-income countries may weaken their bargaining
position on other aspects of the treaty, most often by granting high-income countries more favourable withholding
tax rates and higher thresholds for taxation in the source country for a permanent establishment. [FN115] The tradeoff between reduced source-base taxation and obtaining the ability to preserve source tax incentives was recognized
almost as soon as high-income countries began negotiations with low income countries. [FN116] This *557 exacerbates the problem of reduced revenue for low-income countries. Not only do the low-income countries give up tax
revenue by granting the tax incentive for which they require a tax sparing provision; in order to obtain that provision, they also agree to reduce withholding tax rates.
(vi) Conditioned on Negotiating Strength of the Low-Income Country
Granting one low-income country a tax sparing arrangement will undoubtedly encourage other such countries to
seek similar arrangements with their treaty partners, thereby reducing the advantage any one country has. This inevitably discriminates against low-income countries that have neither the political nor the economic clout to press for
tax treaties in the first place, even though they are likely the ones that most need to encourage investment in some
fashion. [FN117] Indeed, a review of the countries that have been able to command a tax sparing provision with
each of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom reveals them to be middle-income countries, including Argentina, China, India, Malaysia, Malta, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and Thailand. Their effectiveness in commanding tax sparing provisions is likely a testament to their treaty negotiators' determination and to their importance as
trading partners for the high-income countries.
*558 (vii) Tax Sparing Is an Inadequate Way to Support Low-Income Countries
Instead of agreeing to tax sparing provisions in their tax treaties with low-income countries, high-income countries should look for ways to prevent tax competition among low-income countries, and for ways to design their own
international tax rules in order to assist tax collections in low-income countries.
IV. The Design of Tax Sparing Provisions
In spite of the strong arguments against the use of tax sparing provisions, some countries will undoubtedly continue to include them in their treaties. Therefore, this section reviews some of the detailed characteristics of tax sparing provisions and recommends design features that will help to achieve their purposes while minimizing their unfairness and limiting their abuse. [FN118] To illustrate the design of existing tax sparing provisions, reference will
be made to the tax treaties of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom.
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A. Non-Reciprocal
When a tax sparing provision is properly constructed, it provides what is in effect a grant from a capitalexporting country to a taxpayer operating in a capital-importing country, to assist in the latter country's development. Therefore, tax sparing provisions should only be included in tax treaties between high- and low-income countries, and they should not be reciprocal. High-income countries should develop an explicit policy defining the circumstances under which they are prepared to negotiate tax sparing provisions and the types of low-income countries
to which they are prepared to extend them. When high-income countries enter into tax sparing provisions with one
another or with medium-income countries, such provisions simply facilitate erosion of *559 the tax base and intercountry tax competition. None of the tax treaties entered into by Australia, Canada, or the United Kingdom contain
reciprocal tax sparing provisions.
B. Types of Income Eligible for Tax Sparing
The focus of tax sparing provisions for Canadian and Australian tax treaty administrators has been to preserve
incentives granted for business income. Of Canada's 37 tax treaties with tax sparing provisions, only seven provide
tax sparing for passive income earned in the form of interest, royalties or dividends. [FN119] The equivalent figures
for Australia are 14 and three. [FN120] The type of income that is subject to tax sparing is not ascertainable on the
face of the treaties negotiated by the United Kingdom.
Tax sparing provisions should only be used to protect incentives that are necessary to the development of the
particular low-income country. The OECD suggests that tax sparing should never be extended to tax expenditures
relating to passive income, [FN121] but this seems to be too broad a restriction. Where manufacturing processes are
an important import, the low-income country's tax concessions for royalty income might appropriately be the subject
of tax sparing. Similarly, although interest income should rarely be the subject of tax sparing, there may be cases
where it is unlikely to attract abuse and where loans may create real economic growth in the low-income country -for example, where a non-financial business lends to a manufacturer in the low-income country.
The tax sparing provision should usually be restricted to business income, but some types of business income
should not be covered. For example, tax incentives for the exploitation of natural resources in low-income countries
are generally unnecessary, since the return to such exploitation usually contains a good deal of economic rent.
*560 C. Types of Eligible Taxpayers
The older treaties made by both Canada and Australia tend to permit both individual (or non-corporate) taxpayers and corporate taxpayers to rely on the tax sparing provision. Over time, however, both countries have tended to
restrict such access to corporate taxpayers only. Presumably this move is designed to reduce possible abuses of the
tax sparing provision, and to facilitate auditing. It would seem to represent best practice.
D. Specific Versus General Tax Sparing Provisions
Tax sparing provisions usually refer to specific legislated incentives for which the tax will be spared. Normally,
the provisions allow for minor modifications in such legislation, and also allow the competent authorities to agree to
grant tax sparing where provisions of a substantially similar character are enacted. All of the tax sparing provisions
in the Australia and U.K. tax treaties refer to specific incentive legislation to which they apply. However, in nine of
its tax treaties, Canada has agreed to a more general tax sparing provision which allows investors to benefit from tax
sparing for a wide range of tax incentive provisions. The provision in Article 23.4 of Canada's treaty with Bulgaria
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is illustrative:
[T]ax payable under the law of Bulgaria by a company which is a resident of Canada in respect of profits attributable to manufacturing, tourism and agricultural activities, exploration or exploitation of natural resources and construction or telecommunication projects carried on by it in Bulgaria shall be deemed to include any amount which
would have been payable thereon as Bulgarian tax for any year but for an exemption from, or reduction of, tax
granted for that year or any pan thereof under specific Bulgarian legislation to promote economic development ....
[FN122]
*561 It would seem important that tax sparing provisions be restricted to specific incentive provisions (with
minor modifications) in order to prevent abuse, to assist with oversight and to ensure that the particular incentive is
one which both countries agree will provide benefits to the low-income country.
E. Limiting the Rates for Relief
Another concern is that granting a tax sparing clause will lead the low-income country to artificially increase its
reported notional or not-collected taxes -- for example, to argue that the tax forgone is 40 per cent when realistically
it would only have been 30 per cent. To avoid manipulation of the value of the tax sparing credit, the tax sparing
provision should limit the rate of tax reduction that will be recognized. This would reduce the risk that the lowincome country will abuse the provision by artificially increasing the rate of the underlying tax incentive or by
“soaking up” the possible foreign tax credit.
F. Sunset Clauses
Treaty negotiators have often imposed time restrictions on the ability of investors to benefit from tax sparing
clauses. Two approaches have been used. First, a time limit may be set that begins to run either when the treaty is
signed or when it comes into force. This approach has become increasingly popular. In the United Kingdom, for
example, of the 15 treaties with tax sparing provisions negotiated in the 1990s, eleven had time limits based on the
date of entry into the tax treaty. Similarly, in Canada, of the eleven tax treaties negotiated during the 1990s and up to
2003, four included this kind of sunset period. While this does not sound like a high ratio, in fact all four of the Canadian treaties which have taken this approach to the sunset period were negotiated relatively recently. Australia has
included some form of sunset period in all of its *562 tax sparing provisions, and of the 14 Australian tax treaties
that include tax sparing provisions, all but three rely on this general approach. [FN123]
Second, some tax treaties limit how long a particular taxpayer may have access to the tax sparing provision. In
other words, that provision may be invoked so long as the tax treaty itself is in force, but any particular taxpayer can
only access it for a restricted period of time. This is the method commonly used in the United Kingdom, where in 29
treaties with tax sparing provisions, taxpayers' access to the provision is restricted to ten years, and in Canada where
23 tax treaties also include a ten-year restriction. No Australian treaty takes this approach.
If there is no time restriction on accessing a tax sparing provision taxpayers can benefit from it as long as the
treaty is in force. Australia provides unlimited access to the tax sparing provision in three of its 14 treaties, Canada
in eleven of thirty-seven, and the United Kingdom in only five of 46.
Despite the obvious attraction of sunset clauses in tax sparing provisions, they do create perverse incentives. If
the time limit begins to run when the treaty is signed or takes effect, it creates an incentive to quickly repatriate profits out of the low-income jurisdiction. If the time limit is tied to a particular taxpayer, it creates incentives to set up
“new” companies, [FN124] or to use transfer pricing to move profits between related companies. [FN125] Given the
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difficulty of policing the boundaries between new investment and reinvestment, and as a concession to simplicity,
tax sparing provisions should terminate upon notice by the high-income country (the low-income country can always repeal the legislation), and *563 such notice should have to be provided within a reasonable period of time (for
example, three years). This would ensure that if circumstances change (for example, if a lower-income country becomes middle-income), each party to the treaty can terminate the tax sparing provision without needing to renegotiate the treaty. If the low-income country would like some certainty about the duration of the provision, a minimum
term could be set in advance.
In any case, if the time limit for use of the tax sparing provision is short, it may provide an inadequate incentive
to encourage new investment or reinvestment. The tradeoff between encouraging investors and incurring excessive
losses to the treasury is one that each low-income country must weigh in designing its tax incentives, but if a tax
incentive really is needed to attract a particular kind of investment, short time periods are unlikely to be effective.
[FN126]
G. Anti-Abuse Clauses
A tax sparing provision should include an anti-abuse clause to deal with cases where foreign investors use it for
tax evasion activities with no economic purpose. No treaties entered into by Australia, Canada or the United Kingdom include an anti-abuse clause specific to tax sparing.
H. Reporting Requirements
None of the treaties containing tax sparing provisions signed by Australia, Canada or the U.K. includes any requirement that the companies which benefit from those provisions, or the high-income government, must report on
their use. High-income countries should have to monitor the actions of their investors in order to increase public
accountability for the use of tax sparing provisions, since ultimately those provisions create a subsidy for the investor. Before agreeing to *564 them, investors should have to provide their home government with an accounting of
the activities they will undertake, and an annual report of the activities that qualify for relief. High-income countries
should be required to include the cost of tax sparing provisions in tax expenditure accounts.
Conclusion: The Quest for International Tax Policy that Assists Low-Income Countries
This paper has argued that tax sparing provisions may have their basis in good intentions, but that they can ultimately have bad results, among the most serious of which is the erosion of the tax revenue that low-income country
governments badly need. Hopefully this analysis will contribute to the emerging literature on how high-income
countries can design their international tax systems to facilitate the strengthening of tax bases and tax revenues in
low-income countries. Supporting the ability of low-income countries to raise revenue is critical, and avoiding tax
sparing provisions in tax treaties is one small step that high-income countries can take to that end.
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